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- ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888)))) 11112222////JJJJaaaannnn////99998888 ((((1111....5555....4444)))) ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888))))
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- NNNNAAAAMMMMEEEE
- sudo - execute a command as the superuser
-
- SSSSYYYYNNNNOOOOPPPPSSSSIIIISSSS
- ssssuuuuddddoooo ----VVVV | ----hhhh | ----llll | ----vvvv | ----kkkk | ----ssss | ----HHHH | [ ----bbbb ] | [ ----pppp prompt
- ] [ ----uuuu username/#uid] _c_o_m_m_a_n_d
-
- DDDDEEEESSSSCCCCRRRRIIIIPPPPTTTTIIIIOOOONNNN
- ssssuuuuddddoooo allows a permitted user to execute a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d as the
- superuser (real and effective uid and gid are set to 0 and
- root's group as set in the passwd file respectively).
-
- ssssuuuuddddoooo determines who is an authorized user by consulting the
- file /_e_t_c/_s_u_d_o_e_r_s. By giving ssssuuuuddddoooo the -v flag a user can
- update the time stamp without running a _c_o_m_m_a_n_d. The
- password prompt itself will also time out if the password is
- not entered with N minutes (again, this is defined at
- installation time and defaults to 5 minutes).
-
- If an unauthorized user executes ssssuuuuddddoooo, mail will be sent
- from the user to the local authorities (defined at
- installation time).
-
- ssssuuuuddddoooo was designed to log via the 4.3 BSD _s_y_s_l_o_g(3) facility
- but can log to a file instead if so desired (or to both
- syslog and a file).
-
- All preferences are defined at installation time and are
- derived from the options.h and pathnames.h include files as
- well as as well as the Makefile.
-
- OOOOPPPPTTTTIIIIOOOONNNNSSSS
- ssssuuuuddddoooo accepts the following command line options:
-
- -V The -V (_v_e_r_s_i_o_n) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to print the version
- number and exit.
-
- -l The -l (_l_i_s_t) option will list out the allowed and
- forbidden commands for the user on the current host.
-
- -h The -h (_h_e_l_p) option causes ssssuuuuddddoooo to print the version of
- ssssuuuuddddoooo and a usage message before exiting.
-
- -v If given the -v (_v_a_l_i_d_a_t_e) option, ssssuuuuddddoooo will update the
- user's timestamp file, prompting for a password if
- necessary. This extends the ssssuuuuddddoooo timeout to for another
- N minutes (where N is defined at installation time and
- defaults to 5 minutes) but does not run a command.
-
- -k The -k (_k_i_l_l) option to ssssuuuuddddoooo removes the user's
- timestamp file, thus requiring a password the next time
- ssssuuuuddddoooo is run. This option does not require a password
-
-
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- Page 1 (printed 5/4/98)
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- ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888)))) 11112222////JJJJaaaannnn////99998888 ((((1111....5555....4444)))) ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888))))
-
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-
- and was added to allow a user to revoke ssssuuuuddddoooo permissions
- from a .logout file.
-
- -b The -b (_b_a_c_k_g_r_o_u_n_d) option tells ssssuuuuddddoooo to run the given
- command in the background. Note that if you use the -b
- option you cannot use shell job control to manipulate
- the command.
-
- -p The -p (_p_r_o_m_p_t) option allows you to override the
- default password prompt and use a custom one. If the
- password prompt contains the %u escape, %u will be
- replaced by the user's login name. Similarly, %h will
- be replaced by the local hostname.
-
- -u The -u (_u_s_e_r) option causes sudo to run the specified
- command as a user other than _r_o_o_t. To specify a _u_i_d
- instead of a _u_s_e_r_n_a_m_e, use "#uid".
-
- -s The -s (_s_h_e_l_l) option runs the shell specified by the
- _S_H_E_L_L environmental variable if it is set or the shell
- as specified in _p_a_s_s_w_d(5).
-
- -H The -H (_H_O_M_E) option sets the _H_O_M_E environmental
- variable to the homedir of the target user (root by
- default) as specified in _p_a_s_s_w_d(5).
-
- -- The -- flag indicates that ssssuuuuddddoooo should stop processing
- command line arguments. It is most useful in
- conjunction with the -s flag.
-
- RRRREEEETTTTUUUURRRRNNNN VVVVAAAALLLLUUUUEEEESSSS
- ssssuuuuddddoooo quits with an exit value of 1 if there is a
- configuration/permission problem or if ssssuuuuddddoooo cannot execute
- the given command. In the latter case the error string is
- printed to stderr via _p_e_r_r_o_r(3). If ssssuuuuddddoooo cannot _s_t_a_t(2) one
- or more entries in the user's PATH the error is printed on
- stderr via _p_e_r_r_o_r(3). (If the directory does not exist or
- if it is not really a directory, the entry is ignored and no
- error is printed.) This should not happen under normal
- circumstances. The most common reason for _s_t_a_t(3) to return
- "permission denied" is if you are running an automounter and
- one of the directories in your PATH is on a machine that is
- currently unreachable.
-
- SSSSEEEECCCCUUUURRRRIIIITTTTYYYY NNNNOOOOTTTTEEEESSSS
- ssssuuuuddddoooo tries to be safe when executing external commands.
- Variables that control how dynamic loading and binding is
- done can be used to subvert the program that ssssuuuuddddoooo runs. To
- combat this the LD_*, SHLIB_PATH (HP-UX only), LIBPATH (AIX
- only), and _RLD_* environmental variables are removed from
- the environment passed on to all commands executed. ssssuuuuddddoooo
- will also remove the IFS, ENV, BASH_ENV and KRB_CONF
-
-
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- Page 2 (printed 5/4/98)
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- ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888)))) 11112222////JJJJaaaannnn////99998888 ((((1111....5555....4444)))) ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888))))
-
-
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- variables as they too can pose a threat.
-
- To prevent command spoofing, ssssuuuuddddoooo checks "." and "" (both
- denoting current directory) last when searching for a
- command in the user's PATH (if one or both are in the PATH).
- Note, however, that the actual PATH environmental variable
- is _n_o_t modified and is passed unchanged to the program that
- ssssuuuuddddoooo executes.
-
- For security reasons, if your OS supports shared libraries,
- ssssuuuuddddoooo should always be statically linked unless the dynamic
- loader disables user-defined library search paths for setuid
- programs. (Most modern dynamic loaders do this.)
-
- ssssuuuuddddoooo will check the ownership of its timestamp directory
- (/_v_a_r/_r_u_n/_s_u_d_o or /_t_m_p/._o_d_u_s by default) and ignore the
- directory's contents if it is not owned by root and only
- read, writable, and executable by root. On systems that
- allow users to give files away to root (via chown), if the
- timestamp directory is located in a directory writable by
- anyone (ie: /_t_m_p), it is possible for a user to create the
- timestamp directory before ssssuuuuddddoooo is run. However, because
- ssssuuuuddddoooo checks the ownership and mode of the directory, the
- only damage that can be done is to "hide" files by putting
- them in the timestamp dir. This is unlikely to happen since
- once the timestamp dir is owned by root and inaccessible by
- any other user the user placing files there would be unable
- to get them back out. To get around this issue you can use
- a directory that is not world-writable for the timestamps
- (/_v_a_r/_a_d_m/_s_u_d_o for instance).
-
- sudo will not honor timestamp files set far in the future.
- Timestamp files with a date greater than current_time + 2 *
- TIMEOUT will be ignored and sudo will log the anomaly. This
- is done to keep a user from creating his/her own timestamp
- file with a bogus date.
-
- FFFFIIIILLLLEEEESSSS
- /etc/sudoers file of authorized users.
-
-
- EEEENNNNVVVVIIIIRRRROOOONNNNMMMMEEEENNNNTTTT VVVVAAAARRRRIIIIAAAABBBBLLLLEEEESSSS
- PATH Set to a sane value if SECURE_PATH is set
- SHELL Used to determine shell to run with -s option
- HOME In -s mode, set to homedir of root (or runas user)
- if built with the SHELL_SETS_HOME option
- SUDO_PROMPT Replaces the default password prompt
- SUDO_COMMAND Set to the command run by sudo
- SUDO_USER Set to the login of the user who invoked sudo
- SUDO_UID Set to the uid of the user who invoked sudo
- SUDO_GID Set to the gid of the user who invoked sudo
- SUDO_PS1 If set, PS1 will be set to its value
-
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- Page 3 (printed 5/4/98)
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- ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888)))) 11112222////JJJJaaaannnn////99998888 ((((1111....5555....4444)))) ssssuuuuddddoooo((((8888))))
-
-
-
- AAAAUUUUTTTTHHHHOOOORRRRSSSS
- Many people have worked on ssssuuuuddddoooo over the years, this version
- consists of code written primarily by:
-
- Jeff Nieusma
- David Hieb
- Todd Miller
- Chris Jepeway
-
- See the HISTORY file in the ssssuuuuddddoooo distribution for more
- details.
-
- Please send all bugs, comments, and changes to sudo-
- bugs@courtesan.com.
-
- DDDDIIIISSSSCCCCLLLLAAAAIIIIMMMMEEEERRRR
- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be
- useful, but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied
- warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
- PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more
- details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public
- License along with this program; if not, write to the Free
- Software Foundation, Inc., 675 Mass Ave, Cambridge, MA
- 02139, USA.
-
- CCCCAAAAVVVVEEEEAAAATTTTSSSS
- There is no easy way to prevent a user from gaining a root
- shell if that user has access to commands allow shell
- escapes.
-
- If users have sudo ALL there is nothing to prevent them from
- creating their own program that gives them a root shell
- regardless of any '!' elements in the user specification.
-
- Running shell scripts via ssssuuuuddddoooo can expose the same kernel
- bugs that make setuid shell scripts unsafe on some operating
- systems.
-
- SSSSEEEEEEEE AAAALLLLSSSSOOOO
- _s_u_d_o_e_r_s(5), _v_i_s_u_d_o(8), _s_u(1).
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- Page 4 (printed 5/4/98)
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- Page 5 (printed 5/4/98)
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